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PREFACE 
This discussion paper addresses the objectives and effectiveness 
of the Supplementary Minimum Prices (SMP) Scheme introduced by 
Government in 1978. The paper is valuable in three respects. Firstly, 
it reviews the origins of the scheme, particularly with its inter-
action with the Producer Boards' price stabilisation schemes. Secondly, 
the authors argue that the objectives of the Scheme are not clear and 
have appeared to change over time. Thirdly, evidence is presented to 
suggest that, even if objectives had been consistently maintained, the 
SMP scheme may not be particularly effective in maintaining or increas-
ing pastoral production. 
This project forms part of the A.E.R.U. research programme 
associated with pastoral industry production and policy. Other 
recent publications by the Unit in this area include those con-
cerning an econometric model for the New Zealand Pastoral Livestock 
Sector (Research Report No. 127 by M. T. Laing and Discussion Paper 
No.· 54 by M. T. Laing and A. C. Zwart). 
(vii) 
P. D. Chudleigh 
Director 

SUMMARY 
The perception by Government in 1974 of a need to modify fluctua-
tions in farm product prices resulted in the establishment of the 
Farm Incomes Advisory Committee (the Zanetti Committee) to investigate 
and advise Government on ways of reducing product price and farm 
income fluctuations. This Committee reported early in 1975 and 
recommended the establishment of price stabilisation schemes to 
reduce the fluctuations in farm product prices and the establishment 
of criteria for deciding when Government funded supplementary pay-
ments should be made to achieve adequate farm income levels. 
Following this, Government entered negotiations with the 
N.Z. Wool Board and N.Z. Meat Producers' Board which resulted in 
the introduction of price stabilisation schemes during the 1975/76 
season. These schemes are designed to be market orientated and 
are administered by the Producer Boards. The Government considered 
that such market orientated schemes would provide for price stability 
as well as an adequate level of farm income. 
However, the operation of the schemes up to the 1977/78 season 
did not result in what the Government considered to be an adequate 
income level for the encouragement of increased farm production or 
the level of confidence considered to be necessary for farm produc-
tion expansion. Therefore, the Government introduced the Supplementary 
Minimum Prices (SMP) Scheme at the start of the 1978/79 season in 
order to provide product prices to farmers at a level thought to be 
appropriate for income adequacy and guaranteed those prices (in 
nominal terms) for a total of two seasons in order to provide for 
improved stability and confidence. 
In subsequent years (up to 1981/82), the SMPs generally rose 
in nominal terms from one season to the next but, in real terms, 
they fell considerably, tending to reflect a move toward a market 
price orientation and less emphasis on the income adequacy objective. 
Over the period from SMP introduction to the start of the 1981/82 
season, the SMPs were largely ineffective with regard to producer 
returns as they were either exceeded by market prices or matched 
1. 
2. 
by the Producer Board minimum prices (which are based on market 
expectations). The SMPs announced for the 1981/82 season were, 
however, well ahead of market prices (and the Producer Board 
minimums) and reflected the expressed objective of Government to 
provide prices which would result in farmer income adequacy. These 
prices have resulted in significant supplementary payments to 
farmers during the 1981/82 season. The price levels have been main-
tained (nominally) for the 1982/83 season, reflecting ,a fall of 
approximately 18 per cent in real terms and a move back toward a more 
market level orientation (rather than the maintenance of adequate 
farm incomes). 
The impact of such schemes on farm production levels requires 
examination. Data have been presented that show increased production 
results from increased land investment, rather than increased total 
investment. Also, it is apparent that farm income levels are more 
closely related to other forms of investment (plant, machinery and 
buildings) than to land investment. Therefore, measures which 
alter the level of farm income received are likely to have a more 
significant effect on these other categories of investment than on 
land investment. This means that farm production levels may not 
respond directly to farm income changes and the SMP scheme may not 
result in farm production changes. Also, farm production tends to 
respond to the relative prices of the various products. Therefore, 
distortions in the market relativities, which could easily result 
from the use of SMPs at set product price levels, could lead to 
production distortions which are not related to the market. 
It is therefore desirable that agricultural support of a general 
nature be applied over all products at a similar level either through 
exchange rate adjustment or the provision of a common percentage 
increase in market prices rather than through product specific prices. 
Such assistance would only provide the climate for the encouragement 
of production increases. 
In order to ensure that Government funds were used appropriately 
in ensuring that production increases occurred, such funds should be 
channeled directly to the production land investment area. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
During the early 1970's the questions of output price stability 
and income adequacy were considered to be the most pressing issues 
facing the pastoral sector (Zanetti, 1975). The fluctuations in real 
market prices over the period prior to 1975 gave rise to this concern. 
This resulted in the attention of the Labour Government (1973-1975) 
being focussed on those issues and ways of overcoming the problems 
caused by widely fluctuating export prices and the consequent move-
ments in farm incomes. As a result of this attention, the Minister 
of Agriculture and Fisheries called for an independent inquiry to 
investigate the issues and the Farm Incomes Advisory Committee (the 
Zanetti Committee) was established (late 1974). The Terms of Reference 
of that Committee were as follows: 
" (i) to examine ways of reducing the pronounced 
fluctuations in prices received by producers 
of the major agricultural products; 
(ii) to examine ways of achieving a more consistent 
level of farm incomes and limiting the dis-
ruptive stop-go impact on the New Zealand economy 
as a whole, consistent with the need to maintain 
over time, the maximum level of returns possible 
to producers; 
(iii) in light of the above examinations to recommend 
ways of reducing the pronounced fluctuations in 
product prices, . consistent with the need to main-
tain market orientation of agricultural production 
in New Zealand, and the incentive and ability to 
respond to trends in overseas agricultural policies 
and prices." 
This Committee subsequently reported in March 1975 recommending: 
" 
(i) the setting of a basic price at the beginning of 
the season based on a moving average of recent net 
market returns. The difference between the basic 
price and market price is to be paid as a deficiency 
payment, or collected as a levy as a debit or 
credit to a buffer account. The scheme being in 
essence, self-funding. 
(ii) The establishment of criteria for deciding when 
Government-funded supplementary payments are 
necessary to maintain an adequate income level." 
3. 
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However, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries considered that a
price stabilisation scheme operated by the Meat and Wool Boards would
meet both objectives by stabilising farm prices at a market related
level sufficient to provide for an adequate level of income. Following
negotiations between Government and the Producer Boards, agreement
was reached on the implementation of price stabilisation schemes to
be administered by the Producer Boards. Consequently, legislation was
introduced which brought into existence, late in the 1975/76 season,
price stabilisation schemes in the meat and wool sectors. 1
Following the operation of these schemes over the 1975/76 to
1977/78 seasons, the Government considered that the Government
-objective of income adequacy had not been achieved by the schemes.
As a result, the Supplementary Minimum Prices (SMP) Scheme was
introduced at the beginning of the 1978/79 season. 2
This Discussion Paper reviews the operation of the stabilisation
schemes in relation to their administration (Chapter 2) and their
relationship to the Supplementary Minimum Prices (SMP) Scheme
(Chapter 3). In Chapter 4, a review of the implications of the SMP
scheme is provided and some recommendations are made regarding its
possible improvement.
This Discussion Paper has focussed on the meat and wool agricultural
sectors and therefore discussion of the dairy sector stabilisation
and SMP schemes has not been included.
2 It should be noted that research carried out in 1976 (Chudleigh
and Filan, 1976; Chudleigh, Blackie and Dent, 1976) on the
impact of farm price stabilisation, indicated that while stability
in farm output prices has the potential to assist with macro-
economic stabilisation objectives, the degree of individual farm
income stabilisation was minimal.
CHAPTER 2 
PRICE STABILISATION SCHEMES 
The sharp decline in the income of the meat and wool industry 
during the 1974/75 season prompted the Government to grant the 
sectors $50m to support prices. The sum was transferred to 
Stabilisation Accounts for the meat and wool sectors and these 
accounts were to form the basis of longer term Industry Price 
Stabilisation schemes. The Meat Board received $35m of the grant 
and paid $25m on lamb supplements and $32.8m on beef supplements. 
The deficiency in the Government grant was met by the Meat Board. 
The Wool Board paid $2.3m of its $15mgrant to growers as a direct 
supplement during the 1974/75 season and $5.7m in the following 
season when grower returns failed to reach the stabilised minimum 
price of 124c/kg. The Meat Board was also required to continue 
its supplementation of beef prices during the 1975/76 season paying 
over $llm to beef prodvcers. 
During the 1975/76 season, new price stabilisation schemes were 
introduced by the Meat and Wool Boards which formalised the previous 
arrangements. The following sections of this chapter describe those 
schemes. 
2.1 The N.Z. Meat Producers' Board Scheme 
The Scheme only applies to stock slaughtered for export. A 
Meat Export Prices Committee comprising an independent chairman, 
and two Meat Board and two Government representatives, is respons-
ible for setting at the start of the season, minimum and maximum 
(trigger) prices for the benchmark grades of meat, after consultation 
with the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
Four grades of meat are defined as benchmark grades, as 
they are considered to be representative of the market. The 
benchmark grades are Lamb (PM 13-16 kg), Mutton (ML 22 kg and 
under), Prime Beef (P1, 245.5-270 kg) and Manufacturing Beef 
(Cow M, 145.5-170 kg). A fifth benchmark grade, Bull Beef 
(220.5-245 kg), was added in the 1979/80 season. The minimum 
5. 
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and trigger prices (as defined below) set for each of these grades 
are reflected in all other export grades of each category according 
to their "normal market" price relativities. 
The Committee, in establishing the minimum prices for each 
benchmark grade, has certain rules to follow. The minimum price 
dete~mined has to be within a 10 per cent deviation of an average 
price calculated from the weighted average of the actual market 
price of the preceding year and the estimated market prices for 
the current and forthcoming seasons. The Committee must also 
consider the existing price levels and market prospects for various 
types of meat and other farm products; the desirability of expanding 
the production of meat in New Zealand; and the state of the Meat 
Income Stabilisation Account. 
In setting trigger prices, the Committee must consider existing 
. price levels and market prospects for meat and farm products; the 
desirability of maintaining a sufficient margin above the minimuJl 
price to allow for normal marketing; the state of the Meat Income 
Stabilisation Account; and any other matters considered relevant 
by the Committee. 
Individual commodity accounts for sheep and beef meats ha"e 
been established within the Meat Income Stabilisation Account 
held at the Reserve Bank. The Reserve Bank provides an overdraft 
facility if neceSsaf'J-''dl: a charge -of one per Gent per aiinun..and 
pays interest on deposits at the rate of one per cent. These 
accounts are supplemented by the collection of levies and drawn 
on if supplementary payments are made. It is intended that the 
accounts be self-balancing over time. 
The scheme only operates when the lowest regional schedule 
price, as announced for the week by the Meat Board, 0 f a benchmark 
grade is below the minimum price set by the Committee for the 
season. If this occurs the Meat Board is required to determine 
minimum prices for all grades of meat in the category. The Board 
then may intervene directly in the market and purchase at the 
minimum price, or supplement the schedule price to the extent 
necessary to increase it to the minimum price, or undertake a com-
binatlon of intervention and supplementation. 
7. 
When the lowest regional schedule price of a benchmark grade 
exceeds its trigger price, a levy is imposed on grower returns for 
all grades represented by the benchmark grade at a rate equivalent 
to 50 per cent of the excess over the trigger price. 
2.2 The N.Z. Wool Board Scheme 
The Wool Board Price Smoothing Scheme differs from that operated 
by the Meat Producers Board. In addition to setting minimum and 
trigger prices, the Board operates a flexible market intervention 
policy as part of its price smoothing operations. 
In order to support grower returns, a table of minimum prices 
is set by the Board at the beginning of each season. The Board 
must consult with the Minister of Agriculture and consider the 
market prospects for wool, the funds available for intervention 
and supplementation, the maintenance of wool production, and any 
other matters deemed relevant. A weighted average minimum price 
is then calculated from the table of minimum prices based on the 
volumes of each type of wool sold in the prior season. In order 
to maintain stability in the average minimum price between seasons, 
the price set for the new season may not exceed the previous season's 
level by more than 10 per cent or fall below by more than five per 
cent. At each auction the Board's valuers appraise and set, for 
each lot of wool offered, a floor price based on appropriate minimum 
prices from the table of minimum prices. 
An intervention bidding level is also maintained by the Wool 
Board. This is the level at which the Board will begin to bid 
for a lot to provide additional market support. The level is 
flexible and may be changed from sale to sale, according to market 
circumstances. The intervention level may be higher or lower than 
the floor price. If the intervention level is above the floor 
price, the Wool Board may purchase the lot at the intervention 
level. The grower will receive the intervention level return. 
If the intervention level is below the floor price (and the market 
falls below the floor price), the grower receives the intervention 
level plus a supplem~nt which is paid to the grower to bring his 
8. 
return back to that floor price. The supplement is paid out of the 
Minimum Prices Funding Account, maintained by the Wool Board at the 
Reserve Bank. 
Funds for the account are provided by the Minimum Prices Funding 
levy which is applied currently at one per cent on the gross proceeds 
from all shorn and dead wool. However, the levy is applied in such a 
way as to guarantee that the net return to the grower is not less than 
the minimum floor price. 
A short-term intervention policy, Strata Price Control (SPC), 
is also used when the Board wishes to cushion declines on the market 
without altering the intervention price level. SPC intervention is 
always clearly identified from the normal intervention level and is 
designed to provide a flexible market support through purchases at 
levels above the normal intervention level. 
The Board also operates the Grower Income Retention Scheme, 
which is designed to reduce variations in price. The scheme operates 
by skimming off a specified percentage of the excess market return 
over the trigger level. The trigger price is set at the beginning of 
each season by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries after con-
sultation with the Board. In determining the trigger price level, 
the Minister is required to consider the ruling price levels and the 
market prospects for wool and other farm products, the maintenance of 
a viable and expanding sheep industry, the need to contribute to the 
New Zealand economy, and any other relevant factors. If the adjusted 
weighted average sale price (AWASP) (the prices achieved at a particular 
auction adjusted for the national sale volumes of each grade), exceeds 
the trigger price, the levy is invoked. 
Where the sale price, after the deduction of the minimum prices 
funding levy, exceeds the trigger price a grower retention levy is 
deducted from the return. The rate of the levy is equivalent to fifty 
per cent of the difference between the sale price and the trigger 
price. 
9. 
Collections made under the levy are credited to Individual 
Grower Accounts within the Grower Income Retention Account. Deposits 
are frozen for five years, although they may be released at the 
discretion of the Minister of Agriculture and and Fisheries. 

CHAPTER 3 
THE SUPPLEMENTARY MINIMUM PRICES SCHEME 
3.1 Introduction 
The recommendations of the Zanetti Committee included the need 
for income adequacy as well as price stabilisation. 
As already discussed, the producer boards assumed responsibility 
for the implementation and administration of price stabilisation 
schemes. The Meat Board declared that it was "a Government respons-
ibility to ensure producers an adequate income after consultation 
with the Producer Boards." (N.Z. Meat Producers' Annual Report, 
1975, p.28). 
The operation of the stabilisation schemes over the 1975/76, 
1976/77 and 1977/78 seasons had been viewed with concern by Government. 
It had been anticipated (by Government) that the schemes would provide 
for the stabilisation of farm product prices as well as the achieve-
ment of an adequate level of farm income based on market returns. 
In the opinion of the Government, neither of these objectives had 
been met over the three years of stabilisation scheme operation and 
it was therefore decided that a new scheme should be introduced 
with the objectives of improved stabilisation and farm income adequacy. 
In the 1978 Budget, the Government expressed the opinion that 
there was a considerable need to induce a higher level of confidence 
in the agricultural sector. It was expected that such confidence 
would result in an expansion of output and so lead to continued growth 
in the export earnings from the agricultural sector. The Minister of 
Finance stated that the most appropriate remedy to the problem was to 
guarantee to farmers "prices for primary products which will give them 
a more adequate return for their efforts" (1978 Budget, p.16) and 
that this was to be achieved by establishing and underwriting new 
minimum prices to supplement those operated by the various Producer 
Boards. The Minister expressed the view that these Supplementary 
Minimum Prices (SMPs) would more adequately provide for farmers' 
reasonable requirements for living expenses, farm operating expendi-
ture and new development than the Producer Boards' schemes. It was 
11. 
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hoped that in setting the minimum prices for two years ahead, rather 
than the single season orientation of the Producer Board Schemes, 
that the farmer would have an assured and realistic base from which 
to plan. 
It was announced that the Boards would administer the scheme 
using Government funds. These funds, drawn in the event of market 
prices falling below the SMP would be provided temporarily from 
Reserve Bank overdraft and ultimately from Government revenue. The 
scheme was not designed to be self-balancing and was to be "no more 
than an interim measure" (1978 Budget). The desirability of changing 
the present structure of the price smoothing arrangements was also 
stressed by the Minister. 
A much briefer comment was made by the Minister in the 1979 
Budget: "The guaranteed prices will be moved closer to next 
season's expected market levels, and the scheme will continue to 
operate in parallel with the minimum prices scheme and price smooth-
ing arrangements operated by the Producer Boards" (1979 Budget, 
p.12). This suggests that the emphasis had moved from the original 
idea of providing income adequacy to farmers, and been replaced by a 
slightly more market orientation designed to protect the farmer from 
short term price recessions. The Government claimed that the success-
ful introduction of the Supplementary Minimum Prices Scheme had meant 
that farmers could plan and invest to increase production knowing in 
advance the minimum prices they will receive for the next two seasons, 
and that this knowledge should allow the agricultural sector to "play 
its full part in generating export-led growth" (1979 Budget, p.12). 
A reaffirmation of the Government's intention to merge the 
SMP scheme with the Boards' price smoothing arrangements was 
also made in the 1979 Budget, but no indication was given as to 
the form of the final package. The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries expressed the view (Economic Review of New Zealand 
Agriculture, 1979, p.ll) that a likely arrangement would involve 
the continuance of the Producer Boards' schemes, with minimum 
prices being set at "realistic" levels, and the Government assum-
ing responsibility for support in the event of major price recessions 
of the magnitude of the beef price slump in 1974 or the drop in 
wool prices in 1974/75. 
13. 
The cautious interpretation of the role of the SMP scheme 
continued in the 1980 Budget announcement with the Government indi-
cating that the SMP scheme was more intended to provide a guaranteed 
price to farmers for a two year period rather than including any 
mention of income adequacy. However, this movement was reversed 
with the announcement of prices for the 1981/82 and 1982/83 seasons 
when, in the 1981 Budget, the Government moved well ahead of the 
market price levels in the setting of the Supplementary Minimum Prices. 
This shift in interpretation can perhaps be seen as a Government 
return towards the income adequacy orientation of the SMP scheme. 
Although income adequacy had been announced by the Government (1978) 
to be one of the objectives of the SMP scheme, it was apparently 
ignored in subsequent budgets, in favour of price stability objectives, 
until the 1981 announcements. 
It may not be inappropriate to suggest that the relatively 
high price levels announced for the 1981/82 season (and the sub-
sequent season) in the 1981 Budget, may have been related to the 
political situation at that time, in that 1981 was an election 
year. It should be noted that significant payments in the dairy 
sector occurred in 1979, the year following an election, and it 
could be, therefore, that prices which reflect the need for income 
adequacy could be announced again in the 1984 Budget to apply for 
the 1984-85 season. In view of the substantial payouts during the 
1981/82 season, it is not likely that the supplementary minimum 
prices will be increased for the 1982/83 season (recently confirmed 
by the Minister of Finance). This would reflect a real decline in 
the income provided by those prices and reflects a movement away 
from the adequacy of income justification for the SMP scheme. There-
fore, it could be stated that the SMP scheme is intended to provide 
income adequacy to farmers where this reflects a probable political 
benefit and, where this benefit is not so obvious, the scheme is 
intended to provide stability for farmer investment planning. 
Both the stabilisation schemes and the SMP scheme do provide 
a floor to the market for the various products. This could be 
14. 
expected to result in increased farmer confidence but the impact of 
this on farmer production may vary according to the perceived 
adequacy of that base. 
Figures 1 to 5 display the meat and wool prices for the 1975/76 
to 1980/81 seasons. All prices have been deflated to a base of 
September 1981 (using the sheepfarmers input prices index) and are 
presented on a monthly basis. For wool, the market price is the 
average monthly AWASP (adjusted weig~ted average sale price) for the 
auction sales held in the month. The meat prices are the mid-month 
schedule prices for the relevant indicator grades as published by 
the N.Z. Meat Producers' Board. The market prices and the price 
index are given in Appendix 1. Details of the payments and receipts 
of the meat and wool price stabilisation schemes are given in Appendix 2. 
3.2 Wool 
The stabilisation scheme minimum and trigger prices for wool 
(Figure 1) maintained a slow decline in real terms over the period 
through to the end of the 1978/79 season (June 1979) and following 
that, the prices implemented by the Wool Board reflected a more 
significant decline (in real terms). 
Following supplementary payments from Government funds of 
$2.3 million in the 1974/75 season (under the informal stabilisation 
(subsidy) scheme operating for the 1974/75 season), payments of 
$5.2 million occurred in the 1975/76 season. Over the rest of the 
period up to 1981/82, no further supplementary payments were made 
under the Wool Board stabilisation scheme. (Details of the movement 
of funds are given in Appendix 2). 
However, the intervention activities of the Corporation/Board 
were important over the same period with 132,000 bales being purchased 
in the 1976/77 season and 122,000 bales in 1977/78. Only small 
purchases occurred in the 1978/79 and 1979/80 seasons. In the 1980/81 
season, purchases increased to 316,000 bales (18 per cent of the 
offering) in an attempt to maintain prices. These activities had 
more influence on the return received by farmers than did the 
cents/kg
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stabilisation scheme for most of the period (except for the 1976/77 
retentions and their refund in 1977/78). 
During the 1976/77 season, wool income retentions of $26.7 million 
were made when the trigger price was exceeded. Although this was not 
due for repayment until five years later, Government authorised its 
repayment in the 1977/78 season when wool prices fell sharply. There 
were, however, no supplementary payments as the Wool Board minimum 
price was not reached. 
Reflecting Government's concern over the low level of the Wool 
Board minimum price, ·the SMP for the 1978/79 season was established 
at a level 20 per cent higher than the Wool Board minimum. This 
had a minimal impact during that season as the actual market price 
was in excess of the SMP for most of the season. For the 1979/80 
season, the real level of the SMP was restored, to the equivalent 
of the beginning of the 1978/79 season, at a level 17 per cent higher 
than the Wool Board minimum. This was allowed to erode, through 
inflation, and was kept at the same actual level for the 1980/81 
season (nine per cent higher than the Board minimum), a real decline 
of 21 per cent from the beginning of the 1979/80 season. This 
movement did not have any effect on the prices farmers received 
for wool as the SMP was below the market price. However, the real 
reduction in the price and its movement closer to the Board minimum 
price reflected a move away from the income adequacy objective towards 
a more market orientated approach. In 1981, the objective of income 
adequacy again became apparent with the raising of the SMP by 31 per 
cent for the 1981/82 season. 
It could be suggested that the 1981/82 SMP for wool was set at 
a market related level given that the N.Z. Institute of Economic 
Research forecast an improved wool market for 1981/82. However, 
the raising of SMP's for all meat products to well above their indi-
cated market levels tends to suggest a general movement towards the 
provision of increased income. 
Up until the 1981/82 season, the SMP has been ineffective in 
improving price stability or ensuring income adequacy. Even during 
the 1981/82 season, the impact of the SMP with regard to income 
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adequacy may be questioned, as the real level of SMP is still lower 
than that at the beginning of the 1978/79 season. The impact on 
price stabilisation could be regarded as relevant as prices were 
restored to the level operating at the end of the 1979/80 season 
following a lower price in 1980/81. The actual market price for 
wool continued to fall during the latter half of 1981 and early 1982. 
3.3 Meat 
3.3.1 Lamb Over the period from the 1975/76 season to the 
present, the Meat Producers' Board's stabilisation scheme for lamb 
has been largely ineffective. With the exception of a short period 
early in the 1979/80 season and early in the 1980/81 season, the 
stabilisation scheme minimum price has been below the market price 
(Figure 2). Also, apart from December 1976, the trigger price has 
not been exceeded by the market price. During the period, reasonably 
large fluctuations have occurred in the schedule price for lamb, 
especially in December 1976, October 1978 and February 1980 and 
the stabilisation scheme has had minimal impact. (It should be 
noted that $24.99 million was paid out under the informal subsidy 
scheme operating during the 1974/75 season). 
The introduction of the SMP scheme at the beginning of the 
1978/79 season had very little impact on the prices received by 
farmers. Although the SMP was well above the previous season's 
minimum price, the Meat Board minimum price (based on market criteria) 
exceeded the SMP. In the following season, the real level of SMP was 
maintained but this was matched by the Meat Board minimum price. In 
the 1980/81 season, the Meat Board minimum price again exceeded 
the SMP. The real increase in the minimum price was five per cent 
(as compared with the beginning of the previous season) while the 
SMP rose by three per cent. Again, neither the minimum price nor 
the SMP had any impact on producer returns as market prices remained 
above their level. 
For the 1981/82 season, however, the SMP was raised by nine 
per cent in real terms, over the start of the 1980/81 season. This 
was 31 per cent over the 1980/81 season end level, a point well 
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ahead of market prices. The Meat Board minimum price remained 
largely unchanged from the previous end of season level. This 
clearly reflected a move toward providing for income adequacy 
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rather than price stability, especially as the SMP was approximately 
22 per cent above the end of season (1980/81) market price (the 
move could therefore be viewed as destabilising). The new SMP level 
exceeded the real market return over the period since March 1977 
(except for October and November 1978) and clearly indicates the 
desire of Government to inject funds into the farming sector through 
the return for lamb. The maintenance of that price level for the 
1982/83 season reflects a reduction in Government enthusiasm for 
maintaining returns in real terms as a result of the fall in real 
value of the 1982/83 SMP by an estimated 18 per cent over the 1981/82 
season. 
Overall, it can be observed that the SMP for lamb has had little 
impact on prices received up to the 1981/82 season and that the SMP 
level for the 1981/82 season was clearly designed with increased 
income objectives in mind, rather than price stability. 
3.3.2 Mutton The Meat Board stabilisation prices for mutton 
have had more effect than those for lamb. The trigger price was 
effective during the 1976/77 season (and briefly in the 1977/78 
season) and again during the 1978/79 season (Figure 3). Also, 
during the 1977/78 season, the minimum price reduced the fall in 
farm gate prices through the Meat Board acquiring mutton at the 
minimum price. Subsequent to that time, neither the trigger price 
nor the minimum price had been effective in reducing the price 
fluctuations that have occurred. 
The SMP announced for the 1978/79 season was matched by the 
Meat Board minimum price and therefore the SMP did not have any 
impact on the prices received. The SMP for the 1979/80 season was 
increased by nine per cent in real terms (over the start of the 
1978/79 season, 30 per cent over the 1978/79 season end). This was 
close to, but below, market prices throughout the season. A small 
increase was made for the 1980/81 season (eight per cent over 1979/80 
season end but 13 per cent less than the 1979/80 season opening SMP 
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in real terms) but market prices remained well above the SMP level. 
The SMP announced for 1981/82 was 16 per cent above the 1980/81 
season end SMP (but four per cent below the 1980/81 season opening 
SMP level) in real terms and significantly ahead of market price 
levels. It is difficult to identify any income adequacy result from 
this SMP as in real terms it is below previous SMP levels and previous 
market prices. Therefore, the mutton SMP for 1981/82 can only be 
regarded as a contribution to the achievement of further stability. 
3.3.3 Beef The manufacturing beef and prime beef market 
prices move in a similar manner as do the stabilisation prices and 
SMPs (Figures 4 and 5). 
Prior to the 1978/79 season, the beef price stabilisation 
scheme had had very little impact. (It should be noted that a 
substantial payout from Government funds took place under the infor-
mal scheme in 1974/75). However, during the 1978/79 season, beef 
prices rose substantially and there were significant levy collections 
(approximately $40 million). For the following season, both the 
minimum and trigger prices were raised substantially and payments 
of supplements occurred ($9.7 million) in the latter half of the 
season following a fall in the market price. The minimum price 
was maintained for the 1980/81 season and supplementary payments of 
$23.5 million were made. (These prices represented a fall of 19 per 
cent in real terms for manufacturing beef). The same minimum price 
was maintained for the 1981/82 season (a further real reduction of 
18 per cent (for manufacturing beef)) and supplements have continued. 
The SMPs introduced for the 1978/79 season were substantially 
above the Meat Board minimum prices, reflecting the Government's 
desire to ensure income adequacy, but they were substantially exceeded 
by market prices. For the 1979/80 season, the manufacturing beef 
(cow) SMP was the same as the Meat Board minimum price while the 
prime beef SMP was slightly below the Meat Board minimum. In the 
1980/81 season, the situation was reversed. Therefore, over the 
period up to 1981/82, the SMPs have been largely ineffective in 
ensuring an adequate return to farmers. As well, from the beginning 
of the 1979/80 season to the end of the 1980/81 season, the real 
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value of the SMPs had declined by approximately 30 per cent as they 
moved down following the market price and the Meat Board minimum 
price (which was contributing to stabilisation). The sharp increase 
in the 1981/82 SMP (by 18 per cent over the previous season end) 
away from the market price (and the Meat Board minimum) reflected 
a move toward income adequacy assurance. The new SMP level was 
comparable with the level established at the beginning of the scheme 
(1978/79) and bore little relationship to current market conditions. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The SMP scheme was introduced to provide for income adequacy 
and farmer confidence following the perceived failure of the Producer 
Board stabilisation schemes in this area. As a consequence, the SMPs 
were set in 1978 at a level appropriate for the achievement of an 
adequate level of income. In all cases market prices, or the minimum 
prices set by the Boards, matched or exceeded the SMPs and therefore 
the SMPs were not effective in influencing incomes. Over the subse-
quent seasons, the minimum prices or market prices continued to exceed 
or match the SMP levels. The SMPs declined in real terms to reflect 
a more market orientated approach with a greater emphasis on the 
stability and farmer confidence areas. This trend was reversed in 
1981 with the announcement of the 1981/82 SMPs and the return toward 
supporting farm incomes. 
In summary, it has been observed that the SMPs have been applied 
inconsistently, reflecting the confused objectives of the scheme. It 
is probable, therefore, that apart from providing a level of market 
guarantee, the SMP scheme has been ineffective in encouraging increased 
production. Also, even if the income adequacy objectives of the SMP 
scheme had been achieved consistently, it is likely that this may not 
have resulted in increased production due to the unclear link between 
income adequacy and productive investment. 
The usefulness or otherwise of SMPs will be judged according to 
the farmer production response to attempts to maintain and stabilise 
farm returns (incomes). Therefore the implications of SMPs for 
farmer production should be examined, given that in the future they 
are likely to have an effect on farm incomes, as they have done 
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during the 1981/82 season. The following Chapter of this paper 
discusses those aspects and examines the likely farmer response to 
farm return stability and higher income levels. Some suggestions 
are also made on areas where improvements to farmer support schemes 
could be made. 

CHAPTER 4 
IMPLICATIONS OF SUPPLEMENTARY MINIMUM PRICES 
4.1 Investment, Production and SMPs 
It has long been considered that in order to attain a given 
level of production from the New Zealand pastoral sector and to 
achieve a continuing increase in that level of production, certain 
levels of investment are required. In the past, the level of required 
investment has been expressed as the annual quantum of investment per 
stock unit carried on the acreage. Furthermore, it has been suggested 
that the level of investml~ntis directly related to the overall level 
of income. Therefore, it would seem apparent that any mechanism which 
led to an increase in the income level would also lead to an increase 
in investment. As a result of such an increase in investment, pro-
duction would be expected to increase. 
These concepts can be considered to be behind the conviction 
that the provision of an adequate level of income would result in 
an adequate level of investment. Furthermore, the provision of con-
trolled increases in income would lead directly to desired increases 
in total investment. Such a relationship is reflected in Figure 6 
for the period since 1971. Prior to 1971, the level of investment 
fell sharply although income levels rose slightly. 
It should be noted that both the investment and income indices 
reflect the real gross levels of those parameters, rather than the 
net levels. These measures have been used because a high propor-
tion of investment occurs out of gross income as it is deductible 
for tax purposes and, also, it is not possible to derive a true 
replacement level of investment from the available statistical infor-
The data used to construct the indices are presented in Tables 
12 to 16 in Appendix 3. The gross income has been deflated by the 
All Farming Costs Price Index to a 1971 base and farm investment has 
been calculated from the relevant capital cost expenditures for the 
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three components of plant and machinery, buildings and land and
deflated to the same 1971 base. All the deflated figures have been
converted to indices (1965/66 = 1000).
The comparison of total investment with total farm income con-
ceals some important divisions within the investment parameter. It
is possible to disaggregate total investment into investment on land,3
investment on plant and machinery and investment on buildings (Figure 7).
When this is done, it is apparent that the relationship between income
and investment differs according to the category of investment. Where
the investment is made on plant and machinery, the relationship with
income is very strong. However, this relationship becomes weaker when
income and investment on land and investment on buildings are compared.
Investment on buildings appears to follow a one year lagged relationship
with income. It is probable that this lag reflects the time required
to plan and implement a building programme. This is in contrast to the
ability to invest in new plant and machinery in a very rapid manner as
funds for investment become available. Therefore, although the relation-
ship between investment on buildings and income is not as clear as that
between investment on plant and machinery and income, there is still a
strong link between income and investment on buildings. When investment
on land is considered, however, the relationship between it and income
is also less distinct when compared with plant and machinery investment.
It is apparent that income does have an influence on investment on land;
however, this relationship appears to be reflected in movements about
a longer term trend rather than a~y annual response. It should be noted,
however, that a portion of investment occurs directly from gross income
on a "before tax" basis and therefore is not available in the statistical
data.
At this point, it is useful to consider the importance of the various
forms of investment in relation to the farm production level. It could
be hypothesised that there may not be a clear relationship between invest-
ment on plant and machinery and increased production. This is because
investment of that nature would mainly be on labour saving equipment
rather than equipment which would lead to increased production levels.
Exceptions to that would be where the capacity of a tractor, for example,
was greater than that which it replaced and so allowed for increased culti-
vation and/or land development. However, such a vehicle could also be
3 Investment on land includes investments such as drainage, clearing
scrub, improved pasture and fertiliser.
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used to increase the speed at which the previous level of culti-
vation or development was undertaken so allowing more time for 
other pursuits. Where the investment is on new harvesting equip-
ment, it is probable that this investment will also be used to 
increase the efficiency of the present operation rather than to 
increase the total scale of operation. This is also likely to 
apply to purchases of cultivation equipment and other farm vehicles 
such as four-wheel drive vehicles and farm bikes. A further reason 
for investment in plant and machinery is likely to be the need to 
soak up extra income in a rapid manner in order to achieve the tax 
advantages associated with increased investment on this type of 
farm equipment. This would" tend to be supported by the close 
relationship between investment on plant and machinery and the 
level of income available for such investment. 
With regard to the investment on buildings, it could also be 
hypothesised that this investment relates to improving the present 
production system rather than increasing the total production 
output. The erection of new implement sheds, wool sheds and feed 
storage areas is more likely to be associated with labour saving 
effects rather than increased production. With regard to feed 
storage areas, there will also be a component of improved production 
resulting from either the increase in feed supply available during 
months of feed shortage or an increase in feed quality. However, 
the increase in feed supply and/or quality may be associated with 
a farmer attempting to provide more flexibility in the present 
production system in order, for example, to overcome summer dry 
periods rather than leading to an increase in production. There-
fore, it is likely that investment on buildings will not be highly 
correlated with increases in production. 
Investment on land, is however, likely to be more closely 
related to production levels. Land investment includes the 
development of new areas of land for use in the production system. 
This is likely to be closely correlated with an increase in stock 
numbers. The improvement of existing utilised land through the 
use of fertiliser applications in excess of the maintenance level 
and the associated improvement in pasture growth will also be linked 
closely to increases in production through increased stock numbers 
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and/or per head performance. 
Recent work at Lincoln College (Laing, 1982) which has been 
designed to test hypotheses concerning changes in stock numbers 
and production tends to confirm the suggestions put forward regard-
ing the relationship between the different classes of investment 
and production. Laing has established that changes in breeding 
ewe numbers, wool production, milkfat production, beef breeding 
cow numbers, beef heifer numbers and prime beef production are all 
positively correlated with investment on land made two years prior 
to the change in the production parameter. The period over which the 
data were gathered to arrive at these conclusions was from 1958-80. 
Over that time, it was apparent that the investment on plant and 
machinery and on buildings was not significant in determining changes 
in the production statistics. Based on these econometric tests it is 
valid to conclude that the investment on land is the prime investment 
factor to consider when looking at changes in agricultural production 
levels. 
In summary, it can be clearly established that movements in the 
level of total investment in agriculture are not a good indicator 
of potential movements in production. In order to arrive at a more 
adequate indicator, it is necessary to divide investment into the 
three relevant categories of investment on plant and machinery, 
investment on buildings and investment on land. Investment on 
plant and machinery and investment on buildings is more closely 
related to changes in the level of income than is investment on 
land. Also, investment on plant and machinery and investment on 
buildings is not closely related to increases in agricultural 
production. Production increases tend to result more from invest-
ment on land rather than investment in the other two categories. 
This implies that annual income changes are more likely to result in 
changes in the investment on plant and machinery and buildings rather 
than changes in the investment on land. However, the general level 
of income is considered to be related to the general level of invest-
ment on land (given the longer term response in production from land 
investment) and therefore any action taken to alter the general 
level of income could be expected to result in an alteration of the 
level of investment on land. Therefore, it could be suggested that 
Government policy initiatives which are designed to encourage 
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increased production through an influence on the level and variation 
in income should be related to the overall level of income rather than 
the removal of income fluctuations. 
A further point to consider in any review of this nature is 
whether the use of the product price mechanism is the most appropriate 
method of ensuring the achievement of a desirable increase in the 
level of investment on land. As has been established, the relation-
ship between income and investment on land is not very strong,' there 
being considerable room for leakage from the income into other areas 
which are not closely related to increased production. In addition, 
it has been established (Laing, 1982) that a significant part of 
the change in agricultural production levels is related to the rela-
tive prices of the various agricultural products. Any movement in 
those relativities, therefor~, will have a direct influence on the 
relative levels of production of the various products. The setting 
of supplementary minimum prices at levels which will ensure an adequate 
level of income may not be closely related to the actual market 
relativities which are appropriate over the longer term. This use 
of the price mechanism may therefore, result in the production of 
items which are not being demanded at those prices by the market. 
The potential for the misallocation of resources through the use 
of an artificial price which is not closely related to the prevail-. 
ing market returns could therefore be significant. Given that this 
area for potential problems is apparent and the relationship between 
income and investment on land may not be very strong, it is important 
that other methods of ensuring increased production be considered 
and the potential problems with such methods be compared. 
4.2 International Considerations 
Farm product prices are formed by the translation of export 
market prices at the existing exchange rate and the deduction from 
them of the charges incurred between farm gate and overseas market. 
Changes in farm product returns could take place through a reduction 
in transport charges, an alteration of the exchange rate, or a 
reduction in other costs incurred between farm gate and export. 
With the exception of exchange rate changes, any interference in 
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the other cost structures would be considered to be a direct subsidy 
to the sector which would result in higher prices to farmers. Alter-
ations in the exchange rate structure, which would have implications 
for the total economy, would, however, not be viewed by international 
competitors as a direct subsidy to the agricultural sector. 
If supplementary minimum prices are to be used to ensure that 
farmers receive a higher level of income than they would otherwise 
receive from market returns, the SMPs can be considered to be a 
method of ensuring that the equivalent exchange rate facing the 
agricultural sector is significantly different from that facing the 
rest of the economy. However, the use of export incentives for 
manufacturing industries could also be considered to be a method 
of altering the exchange rate facing those sectors of the economy_ 
Therefore, it might appear that the use of SMPs and export incentives 
is designed to achieve the equivalent of a devaluation of the New 
Zealand exchange rate. On the other hand, the use of supplementary 
minimum prices and export incentives could be considered as direct 
subsidies to the relevant sectors of the economy_ If supplementary 
minimum prices were only to be used to reduce fluctuations in farm 
prices and therefore in farm incomes, where the payments from 
Government were refunded by levies on the farming sector, the 
use of such a mechanism would not result in a long term increase 
in the return to the sector and therefore would not be construed 
as a direct sector subsidy. The self-balancing nature of the 
producer board stabilisation schemes means that those schemes fall 
into this category. 
Given these circumstances and the Government's apparent desire 
to increase the level of income of the agricultural sector through 
the use of SMPs, it is apparent that, on an international basis, the 
mechanism could be interpreted as a direct subsidy. This could 
result in the imposition of countervailing duties against New Zealand 
agricultural exports where the importing country considers that 
exports of products are being made from New Zealand at a cost which 
is less than the production cost. Also, in other international 
negotiations, the New Zealand Government would have to face the 
reality that New Zealand agriculture is subsidised and therefore 
they could not use the argument of non-subsidisation in their attempts 
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to improve New Zealand's competitive postion vis-a-vis other supply-
ing areas where, previously, the New Zealand Government has been able 
to claim unfair subsidisation. This could have a significant impact 
on access to various markets and the return which is available to the 
New Zealand farmer. Given these potential problems, it may be desir-
able to support agriculture in a less direct manner, where the need 
for that support is proven. 
4.3 Possible Alternatives 
In order to achieve an expansion in pastoral based exports it 
is necessary that economic conditions be conducive to encouraging 
such an expansion. The relevant economic conditions in this con-
text, are those which affect the farmer's decision as to the level 
of production he wishes to achieve from his enterprise. Therefore, 
the range of conditions is very wide. Farmer motivational factors 
are very complex and the right combination of circumstances would be 
required in order to result in the desired expansion in agricultural 
production. At present, work is being undertaken at Lincoln College 
with a view to identifying the important motivational factors. 
It is apparent, however, that the return from the output will 
be one of the more significant factors. Therefore, it would be 
appropriate to conclude that the price received for the various 
products will have a significant influence on farmer decision making 
with regard to the expansion of the production system. In this 
context, the use of supplementary minimum prices where these exceed 
the return otherwise available, can be identified as a positive step 
toward encouraging increased production levels. However, recent 
work undertaken by Laing (1982) indicates that it is the relative 
prices of the farm products which are important in determining the 
product mix rather than the absolute level of those prices. The 
artificial influence of SMPs could result in severe production 
distortion. Given this situation, perhaps it would be more appro-
priate for the supplementary minimum prices to be based on the 
payment of an additional incremental percentage of the market returns 
rather than a fixed price or level of payment for particular products. 
An across the board percentage increase would enable the market 
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relativities to be accurately reflected to farmers through the present 
price establishment system. 
Such a system would, however, come very close to the establish-
ment of a special exchange rate for the pastoral sector. If such an 
arrangement is considered to be necessary and desirable, it is prob-
able that there is a significant need for an adjustment of the 
exchange rate as it affects the total New Zealand economy, rather 
than just the agricultural sector. As the use of export incentives 
indicates that there is a need for such an adjustment in the export 
portion of the manufacturing sector, a general devaluation could be 
desirable. In order to lessen the impact of more expensive imported 
materials which would result from a devaluation, it would be necessary 
to remove a significant level of the present import protection. This 
would enable cheaper manufactured imports to compensate for the 
increase in imported raw material costs, thus enabling products to 
be made available in New Zealand at equivalent prices prior to the 
devaluation. 
The concep.tof applying an overall subsidy to the agricultural 
sector, or of having a general devaluation, is a step which relies 
upon the increase in returns stimulating increased production levels 
in a rational manner based on the desire of farmers to increase their 
income via an increase in production. One of the reasons why this 
may not occur is that the increase in returns available to farmers 
for their existing levels of production may not encourage all farmers 
to increase their production levels but some may maintain, or even 
reduce, their existing production level while capital gains are achieved 
through the capitalisation of the incremental potential returns to land 
values. This would mean that farm production would not rise to the 
extent desired. The possibility of such an occurrence should not be 
discounted. Given this, perhaps it would be more appropriate for pro-
duction increases to be encouraged through the use of direct Government 
support in the most appropriate areas. As capital investment in 
land is considered to be the area from whence production increases 
occur, it could be appropriate for Government assistance to be 
directed specifically at encouraging increases in investment on land. 
The provision of such assistance could be linked to the achievement 
of specified production increases from the land development activity. 
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In order to encourage farmers to achieve the desired level of pro-
duction increment, the achievement could be linked to a reduction 
in the interest payable on the development capital provided or a 
reduction in the capital sum owed to the State. Such a programme 
could be carried out through the Rural Bank. It is probable that 
such a diversion of the substantial amount of money that is presently 
available for payment as supplementary amounts on product prices 
would result in very considerable increases in land investment and 
much higher production increases than are likely to result from the 
support of product prices. The dilution of that support by farmers 
through their own decision making regimes means that only a small 
proportion of the support payments find their way into increased 
production through investment on land development. 
This concept is similar to the Land Development Encouragement 
Loans (LDEL) Scheme which operated from 1978 and which has recently 
been terminated. Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries analysis of 
the LDEL scheme (Askwith, 1980) (Appendix 4) indicates that the LDEL 
and Livestock Incentive Scheme (LIS) have contributed significantly 
to recent increases in farm production. The targeting of assistance 
directly upon the production improvement areas (land and livestock) 
can therefore be seen to have been very useful in terms of the 
achievement of the increased production objective. Concern has been 
expressed over the use of the LDEL scheme in encouraging the develop-
ment of marginal land which has subsequently not been proven to be 
economic. Such concern involves the administration of the scheme 
(the loan approval procedures) and could be resolved through an 
adequate review of the loan consideration process. 
In conclusion, Government can take measures in three directions. 
Policies can be implemented which either lead to an increase in 
production gross returns or a decrease in producer input costs. Such 
policies rely on the producer converting the extra income into the 
required development investment which will result in increased 
agricultural production. As there are reasons why such a move-
ment of the incremental resources may not occur (such as the 
impact of the escalation of real farm values) it may be appropriate 
for other means to be considered. The use of direct encouragement 
in the investment field is the third alternative. Where finance is 
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made available to farmers to enable them to increase production 
with the increase in production being tied to a reduction in 
their financial liability, there would seem to be scope for pro-
duction increases to be achieved. Such a system would mean that 
only those farmers with the intention of increasing their production 
would avail themselves of the finance offered to them and production 
increases would be much more likely to occur than under any system 
of improving product prices. Of course, such a system could not 
be expect~d to be successful if product prices were such that the 
production system was in itself unprofitable. It would therefore 
be necessary for action to be taken at both levels in order to 
ensure that economic circumstances were such that product prices 
which resulted in a profit potential were established. Such activity 
should be of an across the board nature, however, rather than on 
selected products, in order to ensure that market relativities 
were maintained. 
4.4 Conclusion 
If continued economic development of New Zealand is to be 
based upon the output of the agricultural sector, it is essential 
that the returns available to the agricultural sector be sufficient 
to encourage farmers to maintain and increase their production level. 
This means that, where necessary, Government activity should be 
directed toward ensuring that the production from the agricultural 
sector provides an adequate return to farmers; this return being 
the objective of the farming enterprise rather than the achieve-
ment of capital gains. In order to provide an adequate return to 
farmers, Government can cause the economy to be altered through 
the adjustment of the exchange rate and other external trade 
policies, it can take specific action on product prices in order 
to raise these to acceptable levels, or it can bring into existence 
subsidies which lower the internal costs of production. At the 
present time, it is apparent that the Government has chosen the 
product price policy option and has accordingly introduced supplement-
ary minimum prices in order to raise the level of return on specified 
agricultural products. This adjustment of the return is, however, 
of a specific nature tQ each product rather than an across the board 
improvement in producer returns. This adjustment therefore fails 
to maintain product market relativities. As a result of this it is 
possible that the direction of farm production changes may be 
inappropriate for future market situations. Therefore, it is 
suggested that if Government support is to be made in this way, 
the support should be f!.'.J"all agricultural products at a specified 
percentage on top of the available market returns. 
It is considered, however, that the present form of support 
should be removed in favour of a general adjustment of the New 
Zealand economy in order to restore the international comparative 
advantage of the New Zealand agricultural sector to the level it 
previously enjoyed. This means that the market prices available 
for the agricultural sector should be sufficient to enable the 
production system to be employed in the provision of the level 
of export income necessary to maintain national economic growth. 
Where there are circumstances which act contrary to this position, 
they ought to be altered. This means that the exchange rate 
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becomes an 'area of prime consideration as does the level of internal 
cost adjustment resulting from inflation and low productivity in 
the agricultural servicing sector. Adjustments in these areas would 
have a longer term and more beneficial effect on agricultural product 
prices. Such artificial supports as SMPs can only attract the 
attention of the international community to the subsidised nature of 
New Zealand agriculture and are, at best, only a palliative for the 
agricultural sector in order to relieve the problems caused by undue 
Government influence in other sectors. 
A further point which must be considered is the definition 
of the objective of the Supplementary Minimum Prices. it has been 
stated that Government intended that the policy should encourage 
the expansion of agricultural output through the guarantee of an 
adequate level of income and, at other times, through the stabil-
isation of that income. However, past practice indicates that the 
level of SMPs tends to be set according to the probable political 
benefit to the Government in setting prices which provide for an 
adequate level of income in election years. 
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In order to assess the usefulness of the SMPs in achieving the 
desired level of production increase, it is necessary to establish 
a relationship between the SMP payments and the level of invest-
ment on land. As production increases largely result from incremental 
land investment, it is apparent that the impact of SMPs must be on 
that aspect of investment if they are to lead to increases in pro-
duction. As SMPs are likely only to be used where there are sudden 
reductions in market returns, it is likely that they will not have a 
very significant impact on investment. This is especially so when 
it is considered that the payments will be used for farm expenses~ 
investment on plant and machinery and investment on buildings as 
well as investment on land. Also, it is apparent that the expendi-
ture on farm working expenses and plant and machinery is very closely 
related to the level of gross income, which is the parameter affected 
by the SMP payment. Therefore, there is considerable scope for 
dilution of the SMP payment before expenditure on land development 
results. It could be, therefore, that policies directed toward 
encouraging land investment should be applied in a more direct 
manner. In order to achieve the desired production increase, such 
assistance in the land development financing area could be tied to 
target ted production increases and the benefits available from 
Government would only be granted where target ted production increases 
are achieved. 
In conclusion, the use of Supplementary Minimum Prices seems 
to be an inefficient way of achieving the desired objective of 
increases in agricultural production. There would appear to be 
other more effective methods to achieve this objective. 
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APPENDIX 1 
PRODUCT PRICES AND SHEEP FARMING COSTS 
PRICE INDEX 

1975/76
--
July 1,478
August 1,494
September 1,510
October 1,525
November 1,539
December 1,554
January 1,574
February 1,594
March 1,615
April 1,631
May 1,646
June 1,662
The quarterly series
basis.
P Provisional
* Estimated
TABLE 1
1
Sheep Farming Costs Price Index
(Base June 1971 = 1000)
1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82
1,710 1,986 2,178 2,521 3,232 3,908
1,759 2,018 2,204 2,625 3,317 4,009
1,807 2,051 2,231 2,729 3,403 4,113
1,817 2,070 2,255 2,757 3,430 4,132P
1,826 2,090 2,279 2,785 3,456 4,15};;
1,836 2,109 2,303 2,813 3,483 4,174P
1,847 2,122 2,312 2,839 3,547 4,274*
1,858 2,135 2,322 2,866 3,610 4,320*
1,869 2,148 2,331 2,892 3,674 4,393*
1,897 2,149 2,360 2,977 3,718 4,466*
1,925 2,151 2,388 3,061 3,762 4,538*
1,953 2,152 2,417 3,146 3,806 4,611*
published by the New Zealand Department of Statistics disaggregated to a monthly
Source: Monthly Abstract of Statistics -1:-
---J
.
TABLE 2
Average Monthly Wool AWASP .P-Cb
.
c/kg
1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82
July - - - - 243.84
August 118.74 198.61 190.97 198.99 256.50 250.56 271. 90
September 115.42 200.67 196.59 206.93 266.40 252.93 272.80
October 127. 11 230.05 204.17 210.51 286.29 250.52 265.78
November 140.45 227.03 194.87 206.15 277.60 251.09 253.67 1
December 145.55 228.90 184.09 203.78 262.25 249.07 247.67
January 154.09 22~.62 175.43 204.48 261. 99 247.33 245.63
February 154.76 214.56 184.93 222.06 270.27 246.17 255.78
March 168.35 211 .42 185.02 241.98 268.78 245.31 265.00
April 170.79 198.32 186.12 235.51 249.71 245.59 251.43
May 169.75 187.01 194.96 230.60 245.37 256.10 252.75
June 171. 70 185.93 199.73 231.34 246.06 265.37 249.60
Source: New Zealand Wool Board
From November 1981 to June 1982, the "Market Indicator" has been used. This ~xcludes Wool Board
supplements which became effective during November 1981.
TABLE 3
Lamb Mid Month Market Prices
(PM 13-16 kg)
c/kg
1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82
October 56.2 68.4 68.5 90.7 86.5 113.0 124.0
November 53.2 69.0 68.5 87.0 86.0 114.0 124.0
December 53.2 80.0 68.3 76.5 86.0 113.0 121.0
January 53.2 70.3 66.2 73.5 86.0 113.0 137.0
February 53.2 70.3 66.5 73.5 86.0 114.0 141.0
March 53.2 70.3 66.5 73.5 93.0 114.0 132.3
Apri.l 55.2 64.9 67.0 75.5 100.0 114.0 120.0
May 63.0 64.9 67.0 75.5 102.0 115.0 120.0
June 63.0 64.9 72.0 82.5 106.0 124.0 120.0
July 63.0 64.9 74.0 86.5 106.0 122.0
August 63.0 64.9 :-{4.0 86.5 106.0 118.0
September 63.0 64.9 74.0 86.5 106.0 118.0
Source: New Zealand Meat Producers Board
.j>
\D
TABLE 4
Mutton Mid-Month Market Prices Ul
0
(ML1 22 kg and under) .
c/kg
1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82
October 24.0 21.5 42.0 30.5 40.0 59.0 43.0
November 24.0 24.5 42.0 31.0 40.0 60.0 43.0
December 22.1 30.5 42.0 30.5 45.0 56.0 43.0
January 22.0 41.0 35.0 30.5 50.0 56.0 43.0
February 22.0 46.0 35.0 30.5 50.0 57.0 43.0
March 22.0 46.0 35.0 34.5 45.0 57.0 43.0
April 23.0 46.0 30.0 47.5 45.0 57.0 43.0
May 23.0 46.0 30.0 47.5 45.0 57.0 43.0
June 23.0 46.0 30.0 47.5 42.0 51.0 43.0
July 23.0 42.0 30.0 47.5 42.0 51.0
August 23.0 42.0 30.0 47.5 42.0 51.0
September 23.0 42.0 30.0 40.0 42.0 43.0
Source: N.Z. Meat Producers Board
TABLE 5
Manufacturing Cow Mid-Month Market Prices
(M 140 kg+)
c/kg
1975/76 1 1976/77 1 1977/781 1978/79 1 1979/80 1 1980/81 1981/82
October 41.64 42.30 44.88 79.47 106.46 105.00 '93.00
November 41.64 42.30 44.64 76.47 116.46 113.00 87.00
December 41.68 47.32 47.36 85.44 117.45 105.00 86.00
January 41.60 49.24 46.92 96.42 124.93 93.00 90.00
February 41.90 54.24 49.51 96.41 116.42 83.00 97.00
March 47.43 52.20 49.59 118.36 102.38 72.00 101.00
April 44.48 47.20 53.53 134.37 100.00 81.00 104.00
May 48.86 50.08 58.2Lf 144.37 100.00 86.00 106.00
June 43.66 44.92 60.50 102.37 100.00 79.00 105.00
July 41.83 42.64 64.36 101.47 100.00 87.00
August 41.68 43.72 64.48 81.48 100.00 93.00
September 42.43 43.92 64.49 101. 50 100.00 95.00
North Island and South Island mid-month schedule published by the New Zealand Meat Board were weighted
for the total beef slaughter per month per island to derive a weighted average schedule for New Zealand.
Source: N.Z. Meat Producers Board \JJl
TABLE 6
Prime Beef Mid-Month Market Prices \Jl
-._- I'\)
(Pl 240.5-270 kg) .
c/kg
1975/76 1 1976/77 1 1977/781 1978/79 1 1979/801 1980/8l 1981/82
October 55.27 55.04 58.46 87.47 128.46 123.00 123.00
November 55.27 55.04 58.37 87.47 136.12 130.00 123.00
December 55.24 61.75 58.26 92.44 143.43 130.00 123.00
January 55.30 68.72 55.82 108.42 136.42 120.00 123.00
February 55.12 68.72 58.77 108.41 136.39 120.50 131.00
March 60.15 62.70 58.73 123.86 127.86 120.50 134.00
April 56.69 58.70 62.76 136.37 112.00 120.00 132.00
May 58.19 58.66 69.50 146.37 112.00 120.00 131.00
June 57.19 57.10 74.50 124.37 112.00 120.00 136.00
July 55.14 56.99 79.36 123.47 112.00 120.00
August 55.17 57.40 79.48 108.48 128.00 120.00
September 55.02 57.47 79.49 123.50 128.00 120.00 .
The North Island and South Island mid-month schedules published by the New Zealand Meat Board were weighted
for the total beef slaughter per month per island to derive a weighted average schedule for New Zealand.
Source: N.Z. Meat Producers Board
APPENDIX 2 
MEAT AND WOOL PRICE STABILISATION SCHEMES 
- PAYMENTS AND RECEIPTS 
55.
1. Wool
TABLE 7
Wool Stabilisation and Supplementary
Minimum Prices (Cents/kg) 1976-1982
Product Year Stabilisation Supplementary Stabilisation Market
Category Ended Minimum Minimum Trigger PriceJune Price Price Price
c/kg c/kg c/kg c/kg
Wool 1976 124 157.1
(greasy) 1977 136 195 219.6
1978 150 215 190.4
1979 170 205 250 218.9
1980 200 235 300 265.1
1981 ' 215 235 330 1 245.0
1982 2503 320 4003 274.22
2
3
Applied from August.
Agricultural Review Committee
New Zealand Wool Board
Source: M Laing (1982)
TABLE 8
Movements in the Wool Income Retention Account
Year Ended 1977 1978 1979 198030 June
$ $ $ $
Opening Balance 26,562,142 45,724
Levy 26,701,654 87,753 45,762 10
Available Funds 26,701,654 26,649,895 45,762 45,734
Refunds 139,512 26,649,895 38 12
Closing Balance 26,562,142 45,724 45,722
Source: Wool Board Annual Reports
1981
$
45,722
45,722
45,722
Year Ended June
Opening Balance
Government Grant
Levy
Wool Board Interest
Other Income
(interest)
Available Funds
Less
Supplements
Other Expenditure
Closing Balance
Wool Board
BorroHings
Transfer of unclaimed money from Wool Income Retention Account
2 From the Agricultural Economist V2 No.4 p.15
Source; Wool Board Annual Reports

2. Meat
57.
TABLE 10
Meat Stabilisation and Supplementary Minimum Prices
(cents/kg) 1976-1982 1
Product Year Stabilisation Supplementary Stabilisation Marke~Ended Minimum Minimum TriggerCategory September Price Price Price Price
Prime Beef 1976 55 56.2
1977 55 80 62.4
1978 57 83 65.5
1979 70 80 96 127.2
1980 112 110 158 120.2p
1981 120 120 1704 119.21982 1254 143 175
Mutton 1976 22 22.8
1977 21 30 43.2
1978 30 40 30.5
1979 30.5 30 42 38.7
1980 35 40 50 44.3
1981 404 43 60 4 54.61982 43 50 65
Lamb 1976 49.5 54.7
1977 55 72 70.1
1978 59 .78 67.0
1979 72 70 95 74.7
1980 86 86 120 92.2
1981 1134 110 1554 124.31982 116 145 160
Manufacturing 1976 40 42.5
Cow 1977 40 60 50.6
1978 41 63 55.6
1979 58 70 80 122.7
1980 100 100 140 103~3
1981 1034 105 1404 81.21982 103 125 150
3 4 1980 160Bull Beef' 110
1981 120 120 175
1982 124 143 175
Source: M Laing
2 Based on year ended June
3 Included for the first time in 1980
4 Source: N.Z. Meat Producers Board
P Provisional
58.
TABLE 11
Meat Income Stabilisation Account
Sheep Meats Sub Account
$m
Year
Ended 1975 1976 1977 197ff- 1979 1980 1981
September
Income
---
Lamb Levy 1.137
Mutton Levy 6.004 0.047 0.491
Interest 0.051 0.072 0.087 0.073 0.073
Profit on
mutton
trading 0.067
25.017 1 7.192 0.119 0.647 0.073 0.073
Less
Lamb
24.992Supplement
Mutton
Supplement
Other 0.6973
Interest 0.027
25.017 0.697
Transferred
to Meat Income
Stabilisation
Account 7.192 (0.577) 0.647 0.073 0.073
Plus Opening
Balance 7.192 6.615 7.262 7.335
Closing
Balance 7.192 6.615 7.262 7.335 7.408
Government Grant and Meat Board Supplement.
2 Includes $12.82m retrospective payment.
3 Loss on trading in mutton.
59.
Continued TABLE 11
Meat Income Stabilisation Account
Beef Sub Account
$m
Year
Ended 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
30 September
Income
Levy 0.392 39.726
Interest 0.005 0.228 0.064
32.869 1 0.392 39.731 0.228 0.064
Less
Beef
Supplement 32.833 11.064 0.125 9.7 23.453
Interest 0.036 0.352 0.393 0.149
Other 3.0002
32.869 14.416 0.518 0.149 9.7 23.453
Transferred
to Meat Income
Stabilisation
Account (14.416) (0.518 ) 0.243 39.731 (9.494) (23.389)
Plus Opening
Balance ( 14.416) (14.934) (14.691) 25.040 15.546
Closing Balance (14.416)(14.934) (14.691) 25.040 15.546 (7.843)
Government Grant and Meat Board Supplement.
2 Reversal of credit from Meat Industry Reserve Account.
60.
Continued TABLE 11
Meat Income Stabilisation Account
($m)
Year
Ended 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
30 September
Opening
Balance (14.415) (7.741) (8.075) 32.303 22.882
Beef (14.416) (0.518) 0.243 39.731 (9.494) (23.389)
Sheepmeat 7.192 (0.577) 0.647 0.073 0.073
Closing Balance 1 (14.416) (7.741) (8.075 ) 32.303 22.882 (0.434)at Reserve Bank
errors due to rounding
1977 was the first year in which the account was divided into the sheepmeat
and beef sub account.
Source: Meat Board Annual Reports
APPENDIX 3 
GROSS FARM INCOME AND INVESTMENT 

TABLE 12
Gross Capital Investment on Plant and Machinery
Year Ended Farm Plant & Machinery 1 Real InvestmentActual Real31 March Capital Price Index Index
$(000) (1971 = 1000) ($1971) $(000) (1966 = 1000)
1966 49,385 769 64,219 1000
1967 47,949 786 61,004 950
1968 39,599 838 47,254 736
1969 40,550 866 46,825 729
1970 45,508 912 49,899 777
1971 53,683 1000 53,683 836
1972 76,651 1073 71,436 1112
1973 111,632 1162 96,069 1496
30 June
1974 106,814 1209 88,349 1376
1975 91,245 1476 61,819 963
1976 134,166 1962 68,382 1065
1977 173,916 2458 70,755 1102
1978 150,457 2776 74,199 844
1979 218,640 3086 70,849 1103
1980 260,674 3581 72,794 1134
1981 302,265* 4109 73,562 1145
* Estimated; based on Agricultural Review Committee estimated net figure.
1966-1970 calculated by M Laing from the New Zealand Department of Statistics Wholesale Price Index.
1971-1981 calculated from a weighted average of New Zealand Department of Statistics Farm Transport and
Farm Plant and Machinery Capital Price Index (1971 base weights).
Source: New Zealand Department of Statistics 0\rw
.
TABLE 13
Gross Capital Investment on Buildings
0\
+-
.
Year Ended Actual Farm Building Real Real Investment31 March Capital Price In1ex Index
$(000) (1971 = 1000) ($1971) $ (000 ) (1966 = 100O)
1966 43,089 710 60,689 1000
1967 43,052 734 58,654 966
1968 36,799 781 47,118 776
1969 31,938 811 39,381 649
1970 29,450 871 33,812 557
1971 34,080 1000 34,080 562
1972 32,503 1099 29,575 487
1973 42,639 1210 35,239 581
30 June
1974 59,624 1355 44,003 725
1975 73,268 1567 46,757 770
1976 78,668 1831 42,965 708
1977 96,739 2144 45, 121 743
1978 104,097 2529 41,161 678
1979 110,463 2911 37,947 625
1980 151,760 3368 45,059 742
1981 174,137* 4126 42,205 695
* Estimated; based on the Agricultural Review Committee's estimated net figure.
1966-1970 calculated by M Laing from New Zealand Department of Statistics Wholesale Price Index.
Source: New Zealand Department of Statistics
TABLE 14
Gross Capital Tnvestfuent on Land
Year Ended 1Actual Farm Land Real Real Investment31 March Capital Price Index Index
$(000 ) (1971 = 1000) ($1971) $(000) (1966 = 1000)
1966 55,182 759 72,704 1000
1967 46,563 773 60,237 829
1968 40,375 838 48,180 663
1969 39,172 892 43,915 604
1970 40,523 932 43,480 598
1971 39,827 1000 39,827 548
1972 34,973 1020 34,287 472
1973 51,783 1110 46,651 642
30 June
1974 64,985 1289 50,415 693
1975 55,439 1504 36,861 507
1976 64,216 1635 39,276 5L,0
1977 75,130 1957 38,390 528
1978 83,744 2234 37,486 516
1979 110,542 2436 45,378 624
1980 147,611 30;:9 47,941 659
1981 167,000* 3835 43,546 599
* Estimated; based on the Agricultural Review Committee's estimated net figure.
1966-1970 calculated by M Laing from New Zealand Department of Statistics Wholesale Price Index.
Source: New Zealand Department of Statistics
(J\
\.Jl
.
66.
TABLE 15
Total-Gross Farm Capital Investment
Year Ended Actual Real Real -Investment
31 March ($1971) Index$(000) $(000 ) (1966 = 1000)
1966 147,656 197,612 1000
1967 137,564 179,895 909
1968 116,773 142,552 721
1969 111,660 130,121 658
1970 115,481 127, 191 644
1971 127,590 127,590 646
1972 144,127 135,298 685
1973 206,054 165,595 838
30 June
1974 231,423 182,767 925
1975 219,952 145,437 736
1976 277,050 150,623 762
1977 345,785 154,266 781
1978 338,298 132,846 672
1979 439,645 154,174 780
1980 566,045 165,794 839
1981 643,402 159,313 806
From Tables 12, 13 and 14.
TABLE 16 
Pastoral Sector Total Gross Farm Income 
Year Ended All Farming Real Index 
31 March $ Cost Price Index $1971 (1966 = 1000) 
1966 791 843 938 1,000 
1967 869 869 1,000 1,066 
1968 862 901 957 1,020 
1969 934 927 1,008 1,075 
1970 949 953 996 1,062 
1971 1,064 1,000 1,064 1,134 
1972 1,237 1,058 1,169 1,246 
1973 1,576 1, 140 1,382 1,473 
1974 1,727 1,295 1,334 1,422 
1975 1, Lf09 1,479 979 1,044 
1976 1,779 1,593 1,117 1, 191 
1977 1 2,109 1,865 1,131 1,206 
1978 2,113 2,105 1,004 1,070 
1979 2,638 2,330 1,132 1,207 
1980 3,431 2,852 1,203 1,282 
1981 3,634 3,464 1,049 1, 119 
Reserve Bank series linked at 1977 with M.A.F. series. 
()\ 
--..:} 
. 
Source: Reserve Bank, M.A.F., New Zealand Department of Statistics 

APPENDIX 4 
THE LIVESTOCK INCENTIVE SCHEME 
AND THE 
LAND DEVELOPMENT ENCOURAGEMENT LOANS SCHEME 

71. 
In answer to the doubt that the current economic conditions 
would delay the commencement of a move towards a target ted 25 per 
cent increase in farm production by 1985, the Government announced 
a new measure intended to improve farm output levels in the form 
of the Livestock Incentive Scheme (LIS). Under this scheme, farmers 
who personally owned stock could elect to obtain either a suspensory 
loan of $12 or a tax deduction from assessable income of $24 per 
qualifying stock unit as an incentive to increase production by 
utilising idle capacity or undertaking a development programme 
which permanently increased the total number of stock units carried. 
Provided the target increase in stock units was greater than two 
per cent and was sustained for the following two' years and all of 
the other conditions of the scheme were met, the suspensory loan 
was to be written off (Budget 1976; pp 10-11). It was envisaged 
that the farmer who was under capitalised would elect the first 
option and the farmer whose property was understocked and whose 
development intentions had been hindered by high marginal taxation 
rates would elect the tax option. However, over 93 per cent of the 
scheme's participating farmers have chosen the loan option, indicat-
ing that the scheme has had its greatest effect on those properties 
requiring additional development to carry increased stock units. 
The scheme expired on 31 March 1982. In the 1977 Budget, the 
Government retrospectively modified the Livestock Incentive Scheme 
in order to allow more farmers to participate by reducing the min-
imum qualifying stock unit increase (from 100 to 50) and by lowering 
the qualifying cumulative percentage increase in stock units (from 
four per cent to three per cent for two year programmes and from 
six per cent to four per cent for three year programmes) (Budget 
1977; p.12). 
Since the inception of the scheme in 1976, 9,923 programmes 
were authorised or approved to 24 June 1980 at a total value of 
$91.53m. Applications were approved for nearly three times as 
many sheep and beef farmers as dairy farmers (Askwith, 1980). 
The Land Development Encouragement Loans (LDEL) Scheme was 
announced in the 1978 Budget. The purpose of this scheme was to 
assist with the development of unimproved reverted land or low 
72. 
producing hill country with the potential to carry more livestock. 
This was to be achieved by providing concessional loans to cover 
the initial costs incurred in developing the land into permanent 
sown pasture including expenditure on fertilisers, lime and drainage. 
Loans (for a 15 year term) to a maximum of $250 per hectare were 
available and provided the improvements were maintained to the satis-
faction of the Rural Bank, the accumulated interest was written off 
periodically and only half the principal sum was repayable. A develop-
ment plan must have been for a minimum of 10 hectares or a large 
enough area for carrying capacity to be increased by at least 100 
stock units (M.A.F., 1982). Farmers receiving L.D.E.L. assistance 
were also eligible for standard development loans for non qualifying 
expenditure including fencing, farm tracks, water supply and buildings, 
and they may also have participated in the L.I.S. The closing date 
for the lodgement of applications for the L.D.E.L. scheme was 
31 March 1981. 
From August 1978, when the L.D.E.L.scheme was announced, until 
the end of May 1980, 3,683 loan applications totalling $67.87m had 
been granted. The total area authorised for development was 457,056 
hectares, and the planned increase was 2.54 million stock units or 
5.6 stock units per hectare. This area was equivalent to 700 new 
sheep and been properties each carrying 3,600 stock units (Askwith 
1980). 
In the year ending March 1980 the qualifying expenditure of 
L.D.E.L. programmes authorised by the Rural Bank varied between $348 
per hectare of land requiring clearing, cultivation and sowing; and 
$77 per hectare for land requiring oversowing only. The average 
qualifying expenditure was $198 per hectare, while the average total 
authorised expenditure paid by the Rural Bank was $158 per hectare 
($29 per stock unit) (Askwith, 1980). 
L.D.E.L.s to qualifying farmers did on average, contribute 
41 per cent of the total development expenditure in the 1980 financial 
year. Where a farmer also operated a L.I.S. programme he received 
an additional $12 per stock unit, contributing an additional 17 per 
cent thus bringing the total contribution to 58 per cent of total 
development expenditure ($41 per stock unit) (Askwith, 1980). A 
7.1m increase in livestock units was expected to result from the 
total number of programmes implemented under both the L.I.S. and 
L.D.E.L. schemes. 
73. 
It is clear that the L.I.S. and L.D.E.L. programmes have con-
tributed to the recent upsurge in production by assisting farmers 
to increase stocking capacity by upgrading low producing unimproved 
or reverted land. Total stock units had actually increased by more 
than 9.1m from 1976 and actual gross capital investment on land had 
nearly doubled from 1978 to an estimated $167m in 1981. 
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